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with him.Transfrontier Pollution and Global Environmental Media
Horst Siebert*
Environmental allocation has important international implications. One
aspect is the impact of environmental scarcity on competitiveness and
trade (Siebert et al 1980). In this approach, among other issues such as
environmental policy and the terms of trade or environmental policy as a
device for protection (Siebert 1991), the repercussions of a country's
environmental policy on the environmental quality of another country
through the international division of labor are (will be?) studied. But
countries may be interlinked more directly via environmental media, for
instance through river systems or atmospheric media or they may use an
international public good jointly. Then the issue arises how the economic
decisions in one country affect environmental quality in the other
country or the jointly-used public good. In this paper, transfrontier and
global environmental issues are analyzed. The non-cooperative and
cooperative solution of transfrontier pollution and global environmental
media are discussed. Policy measures are reviewed.
Transfrontier pollution and global issues have the common feature that
countries are directly linked to each other via environmental media. For
analytical purpose it is worthwhile, however, to distinguish
transfrontier pollution and global environmental systems (Siebert, 1985).
Transfrontier pollution is characterized by a diffusion function T with
i k
environmental quality U
J in one region j being determined by emissions E
not only of region j, but - via the diffusion function T - also by
emissions of region i.
(1)
For instance, T may be uni-directional. In contrast, for an international
public good k, the diffusion function cannot be explicitly defined. The
•Critical comments to this paper by Gernot Klepper and Ernst Mohr are
appreciated. I owe figure 3 to Ernst Mohr.- 2 -
international public good k is used in equal amounts by all, its quality
being determined by emissions in j and i and we have
U




Apparently, the international public good can be interpreted as a special
case of transfrontier pollution where the diffusion function T is not
explicitly considered. In order to give the problem more structure and to
discuss different policy solutions fo,r the two cases, it is worthwhile to
explicitly distinguish the cases of transfrontier pollution and global
environmental media.
1. Transfrontier Pollution
Transfrontier pollution represents an externality between countries and
implies a distortion. The upstream or the upwind country sends pollutants
via the environmental media to the downstream or downwind country. This
implies a distortion. The polluting country reduces its ambient level of
pollution by sending pollutants abroad, thus reducing the opportunity
costs of environmental policy and increasing its comparative advantage
for pollution-intensive activities. In the pollution-receiving country,
the ambient level of pollution is increased and the comparative advantage
of pollution-intensive activities is reduced. Thus, the distortion refers
to environmental allocation as well as to sectoral structure.
Without a solution to transfrontier environmental problems, national
environmental policy operates under the conditions of an international
distortion. This has several implications. The opportunity costs of
protecting the environment in the downstream or downwind country are too
high. This limits the scope of environmental policy and reduces the
optimal environmental quality strived for. Moreover, the obstacles to
environmental policy may be increased by pointing to transfrontier
pollution; environmental policy has to find its reason in being the
forerunner for other countries, as in the German case, hoping for an
international demonstration effect and for other countries to follow.- 3 -
The Non-cooperative Solution to Transfrontier Pollution
In the non-cooperative solution each country maximizes its utility (or
minimizes its costs) separately; the upstream country does not take into
account transfrontier pollution. Note that the two countries are
interpreted as separate units with their own preference functions and
their own abatement functions. The countries are linked via transfrontier
pollution. Let environmental damage depend on pollutants ambient in the
environment with S denoting gross emissions before diffusion and
abatement, T pollutants transferred from region 2 to region 1, S
i
 r
pollutants abated and C costs of abatement. Then, the upstream country 2




1 2 It is assumed that the initial levels of pollution, S and S , are
2) oo
given with the transfer of pollutants not being considered, the
optimality condition requires
2 2
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where pollutants ambient in the environment of region 1 are influenced by
transfrontier pollution. Optimality requires
dQ 1 2 1
 d
c
— (8 +T(S )-S ) - — (6)
dS dS
The optimality conditions 4 and 6 mean that prevented marginal damage is
equal to marginal cost of abatement. In a non-cooperative solution with
each country optimizing separately, the optimality condition implies that
the upstream country considers pollutants transferred abroad as a
substitute for abatement. Consequently, its incentive to abate is
relatively low as shown by point A in figure 1. For the upstream country,- 4 -
2 2'
the transfer of pollutants S S can be interpreted as a leftward shift
in the abatement function. If country 2 abstains from abatement, i.e. if
2 2
Sr «• 0, diffusion depends on the initial level of pollution T « T(SQ).
Abatement reduces the concentration of the pollutant in the ambient and
2
hence transfrontier diffusion declines (dT/dS < 0). If all emissions are
abated, such as under the application of a perfect filter system, there
is no diffusion across borders. It can be argued that pollutants
transferred abroad are proportional to pollutants ambient and,
consequently, of pollutants abated. Therefore, the marginal cost curve in
the reference case of abatement and in the case of transfrontier
pollution intersect on the cost axis. Comparing the two marginal cost
curves for country 2 in figure 1 an international transfer of pollutants
can be interpreted as a costless reduction in the initial level of
pollution.
For the downstream country, however, the import of pollutants via
environmental media increases the "initial" level of pollution and shifts
the cost curve to the right. Optimal abatement is at point A' in figure
1.
An alternative illustration with reaction functions is shown in the
1 2 S -S - space in figure 2. Equations 4 and 6 implicitly define the
reaction functions of the two countries. For the downstream country, 1,
1 2 there is an implicit relation R (S ) between emissions abated in
country 2 and in country 1. The slope is negative. This can be seen from
figure 1. The less country 2 abates, the more the marginal cost curve of
country 1 shifts to the right. As the marginal damage is increasing in
emissions (concentration), country 1 will react with an increase in its
abatement efforts.
I and I are indifference curves of country 1. These indifference curves
must have an extremum on the reaction function R by the definition of
the reaction function. A departure from the reaction curve R violates
optimality. Indifference curves further to the north represent higher
utility levels for country 1 as for given S higher abatement activities




















Upstream Country 2 Downstream Country 1- 6 -
For the upstream country 2, pollutants in the other country do not
2
influence the level of abatement. Its reaction function R is independent
2
of the abatement level in country 1. Note that R is also an indifference
curve of country 2 when the transfer of pollutants is not explicitly
taken into account. Other indifference curves of country 2, not depicted
2
in figure 2, are parallel to R . An indifference curve further away (both
north and south) indicates lower utility levels.
The non-cooperative solution is given by the intersection of the reaction
functions in point A of figure 2. It follows straightforwardly from
figure 2 that the non-cooperative solution in the transfrontier case does
not represent a situation in which one or both of the countries has an
incentive to change its position. In point A, country l's indifference
ll
Figure 2. Non-Cooperative and Cooperative
Solution of Transfrontier Pollution- 7 -
1 2
curve I is tangent to country 2's indifference curve R . Intuitively,
any isolated change in abatement efforts of country 1 would necessarily
worsen the utility of the downstream country and any isolated or
coordinated change in abatement efforts of the upstream country would
necessarily worsen that country's utility. A Pareto-improving
reallocation of abatement activities is therefore impossible under the
given conditions. Nevertheless, there is scope for improvement if the
institutional arrangement changes.
The Cooperative Solution in Transfrontier Pollution
If we allow side payments, at least one country can reach a higher
utility level. In a cooperative solution both countries optimize jointly.
Such payments then redistribute the increase in utility (Kuhl 1987, Mohr





































As before, abatement in the downstream country 1 benefits only that
country. Hence, as before, joint cost minimization requires that the
downstream country's marginal abatement equals its marginal damage costs
(equation 8).
However, contrary to the non-cooperative case, under joint cost
minimization it is taken into account that abatement in the upstream
country benefits both. Joint cost minimization therefore requires that
marginal abatement cost equals the sum of marginal damage costs in both
countries (equation 9). Taken together, equations 8 and 9 imply that- 8 -
under joint cost minimization marginal abatement costs in the downstream
country must necessarily be larger than those upstream. This need not
surprise in the face of the downstream "windfall" associated with
upstream abatement.
1 2
Comparing equations 4 and 9 and taking into account that dG /dS < 0, it
follows that under joint cost minimization the abatement effort upstream
exceeds that under the non-cooperative solution. Hence in figure 2 the
2
joint cost minimium is located above R . Furthermore, the joint cost
minimum must be located on R as R represents the optimality condition 6
which is identical to 8. In figure 2 joint cost minimization is located
in a point like C. Hence, compared to the non-cooperative solution A it
requires greater abatement efforts upstream and smaller efforts
downstream. In figure 1, the marginal damage curve of the upstream
country shifts upward because the negative impact of transfrontier
pollution on the downstream country is taken into account. Relative to A,
more pollutants are abated (point C). In the downstream country 1,
pollution to be abated is reduced.
Side Payments
An immediate question arises as to how this cost-reducing reallocation
can be brought about. After all, we know that any movement from A in the
direction of C by a pure reallocation of efforts reduces utility in the
upstream country. The answer to this is "side payments". The role of side
payments can be illustrated in figure 3 (Kuhl 1987).
Costs assocated with the non-cooperative solution A in figure 2 are
represented by the origin in figure 3. A movement along R in the
upward-left direction in figure 2 corresponds to a movement from A in the
direction of K in figure 3. Such a movement reduces costs to country 1
but increases costs to country 2. Note that contrary to the case of a
global environmental good there is no lense of mutual advantages for both







Figure 3. Reallocation of Abatement
Efforts and Side Payments
Side payments from 1 to 2 can be represented by a line with slope -1
starting on the curve A-K in figure 3. For example, suppose actual
abatement is represented by C in figure 3. Without side payments costs
would be represented by C, too. Obviously such an agreement on cost
minimization could never materialize as 2 loses compared to
non-cooperation in A. This disincentive to cooperate can be mitigated by
side payments from 1 to 2, separating the location which represents
actual abatement costs from the costs (gains) associated with
cooperation. While abatement costs still remain in C, the gains of
cooperation are represented by points on the line through C in the
direction of E. Larger side payments are represented by points on the
line C - E closer to E.
Interestingly, there is a range of side payments for which both countries
can gain. In D, cooperation benefits only the downstream country while
higher abatement costs upstream are exactly set off by the side payments- 10 -
country 2 receives. In E, only country 2 gains while the side payments
that country 1 pays exactly set off its gains from lower environmental
costs. In between D and E both benefit from cooperation.
Joint cost minimization is represented by C in figure 3, at the tangental
point of the utility transformation line and the cost reduction function.
Cost minimization is optimal under side payments for a simple reason. It
maximizes the cake generated by cooperation in a first step. This
"largest-sized" cake can then, in a second step, be distributed amongst
the parties.
The Bargaining Approach to Transfrontier Pollution
While the use of side payments in a cooperative solution uniquely
determines the abatement efforts of the parties to an agreement (point C
in figure 3), the distribution of gains remains only vaguely determined
(between D and E). This non-uniqueness can be resolved by applying
particular cooperative solution concepts or by investigating the
negotiation process which brings about cooperation. Whatever the solution
concept or the particular bargaining situation, any solution to the
cooperation problem is constrained by the outside opportunities of the
parties. In terms of figure 3, these outside opportunities are
represented by a recourse to non-cooperative behavior in A. These outside
opportunities are represented in the solution space to the distribution
problem by points D and E which act as threat points in the negotiations
between the two countries. The voluntary nature of international
environmental agreements guarantees that the solution will be located
somewhere on or in between these limiting points of the bargaining
solution.
In the bargaining process between autonomous countries, we meet all the
problems of environmental policy "in nuce". The environmental media are
used as common property resources, consequently the downwind region has
no property title to force in the polluting area to abate pollutants; it
is not possible to exclude the polluting area from using the environment
as a receptacle of waste. The polluting area can behave as a free rider.- 11 -
Without clearly defined property rights, both countries have to determine
the tolerable level of pollution in a bargaining process.
In a scenario with a one-directional spillover and in which the upwind
country uses the environment as a free good bargaining implies that both
countries can only benefit if the pollutee compensates the polluter to
reduce pollution in the upwind country (victim-pays-principle). Thus, a
side payment is necessary. When bargaining costs are neglected, a
solution of the game according to equation 8 and 9 can be found. This
bargaining result represents a Coase solution (1960) and a Nash solution
(1950) in a cooperative game.
A Nash equilibrium requires that the solution cannot be improved to the
advantage of both regions. This implies individual rationality, i.e. the
solution must be at least as favorable as the initial situation for each
participant. When spillovers are multi-directional, each region has a
threat potential irrespective of compensation.
The bargaining situation is often characterized by information
asymmetries. In the bargaining process, the polluter will exaggerate the
costs of pollution abatement in order to reduce the demands of the other
country. Similarly, it is expected that the victim will exaggerate the
extent of the incurred damages, in order to maximize the assessment of
corrective measures needed. In order to avoid this deliberate
falsification of information about the damages and costs of the
respective abatement, the reciprocal-compensation principle has been
proposed (OECD 1973). It has been suggested that an international fund be
established to which the polluting country would pay according to its
assessment of the damages and victimized land would pay according to its
assessment of the costs of abatement. This approach is designed to
guarantee that the factors determining the emission tax are set as
realistically as possible. The funds collected from the two parties would
then be redistributed to them for the implementation of the
environmental-protection measures. It is essential that the countries do
not know the rate by which the tax receipts will be redistributed because
this information would distort their estimates of the costs and damages.- 12 -
Policy Instruments for Transfrontier Pollution
The solution to the transfrontier pollution problem requires some
commitment of national governments to an international agreement. This
commitment may include ceding national sovereignty in the area of
environmental policy to an international agency, cost-sharing rules,
agreeing on diffusion norms or uniform reductions in national emissions.
In the sense of a causal therapy, a solution should explicitly address
the quantities transmitted, i.e. T(E ) in equation 1. Practical solutions
may affect the quantities transmitted only in an indirect way.
Cost Sharing. In such a transfrontier agency, the costs of pollution
abatement could be shared by the countries involved. The costs of
attaining and maintaining an acceptable level of quality in the
transfrontier environmental medium would be added and distributed among
the countries according to a set rate. Once again, many problems arise
with this proposal. Since costs are determined by the desired level of
environmental quality, how much environmental quality should be strived
for? By what criteria can abatement costs be attributed to different
countries? (See reciprocal compensation procedure.)
A transfrontier agency defined according to the boundaries of a river
system should be clearly distinguished from an approach in which
emissions in the two countries are controlled in general. Reducing the
general level of emissions in a two-country system only affects
transfrontier pollution indirectly and does not solve the basic reason of
distortion. By cutting the level of pollution in the country of origin,
the externality is reduced in importance, but it continues to exist.
Transferable Discharge Permits. If a transfrontier environmental system
can be clearly delineated, marketable discharge systems may be used for
the transfrontier system. It then can be left to the market to find the
price for emissions. In most cases, however, the approach of marketable
discharge permits requires an explicit account of diffusion in order to
determine the price of a unit of pollutants at different points in space.- 13 -
Biblfof hek
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Using transferable discharge permits for the two-country system and thus
limiting the total quantity of emissions in two countries is not the
appropriate approach to solve the transfrontier pollution issue because
it only reduces the general level of pollution in the two-country system,
but does not solve the transfrontier distortion. The same argument
applies to uniform emission reductions in all countries by a given
percentage.
Transfrontier Diffusion Norms. A transfrontier diffusion norm defines the
ambient level of pollution of an environmental medium at the border, for
instance of a tributary to a river or of air quality at the border. Such
diffusion norms have been used in national water management.
A transfrontier diffusion norm allows a decentralized approach to
environmental policy in the countries involved. The upstream or upwind
country having agreed on a diffusion norm, probably not without a side
payment, will internalize the costs of transfrontier pollution to the
individual polluters. In such an approach, it can be left to the
individual countries by which policy instruments they make sure that the
diffusion norm is not violated, and emission tax sales may very well
differ between countries. Transfrontier diffusion norms could be
instrumental in implementing the polluter-pays-principle for the
individual polluter, albeit not for the polluting country possibly
receiving a side payment.
International Liability Rules. Making countries liable for the damages
caused by transfrontier pollution would also permit decentralizing
environmental policy among countries. The upstream or upwind country then
would anticipate the compensation it would have to pay. This would imply
an internalization of environmental costs arising in the downstream
country.
Liability rules, however, imply high transaction costs, more specifically
time-consuming debates in the international court system. Consequently,
liability rules do not represent a dominant solution to transfrontier
pollution.- 14 -
Positive International Spillovers as a Special Case: The Equatorial Rain
Forest
Whereas in the case of transfrontier pollution we have negative
externalities between countries, there are also positive spillovers. A
case in point is the equatorial rain forest. The equatorial rain forest
in Brazil and in other countries has a positive value in absorbing CO ,
producing oxygen and allowing biodiversity. Cutting down the rain forest
would represent a negative externality to other countries.
Similarly, as side payments are required in a solution to reduce
transfrontier pollution, one can argue for side payments to the countries
with a rain forest to induce them not to destroy it. For the bargaining,
however, one difference with the case of transfrontier pollution must be
stressed. It might very well be that it is in the long-run interest of
the rain forest country to maintain the forest for its own advantages
including tourism in the future and that the country has not been aware
of its own interests. A major issue is monitoring. An international
agreement on the protection of the rain forest can be interpreted as a
principal-agent problem where the international community is the
principal and the rain forest country is the agent.
2. Global Environmental Media
In the case of global environmental media, two or more countries jointly
use the environmental system as a public good, and diffusion processes
are not too important. Examples are the ozone layer and the global
warming of the atmosphere. In principle, each country can take the free
rider position, hoping that the other countries will care for the public
good.
In addition to the free rider position other features complicate the
solution to the problem:
Countries or their people may have different preferences with respect
to global environment media and they may have different risk
attitudes.- 15 -
Even assuming Identical preferences and risk attitudes, the Income
per head varies considerably among the countries of the world; this
implies a different evaluation of the global environment.
Although global environmental problems can be interpreted as a public
good for humanity, countries may be affected differently if the
public good changes. This indicates that in spite of Samuelson's
definition (1954) that the public good "is used in equal amounts by
all" the user intensity varies for countries. For instance, global
warming and the resulting melting of the ice caps would negatively
affect the low lands of the earth such as Bangla Desh and the
Netherlands.
The Non-cooperative Solution to Global Media
In contrast to the transfrontier problem, the damage prevented for a
specific country i now depends on reductions of emissions in country i
and j G (S^+S ) or more explicitly G (S + S"' - S - S-'), whereas costs
of abatement are country specific C (S ).
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In the non-cooperative solution, each country abates pollutants up to the
point where its marginal benefit is equal to its cost of abatement. In
figure 4 these optimal points of the non-cooperative solution are- 16 -
12 1
illustrated by A and A respectively. In figure 4, OS is the quantity
of emissions contributed to the global public good by country 1; likewise
2
OS for country 2. OS is the total quantity of emissions by both
countries. Abatement in the non-cooperative solution by country 1 (S D)
and country 2 (S E) add up to S A.
1 2 Equations 9 and 10 implicitly define the reaction functions R (S ) and
2 1
 r
R (S ) of both countries. In figure 5, the reaction functions are shown
in the S - S -space. A is the solution to the non-cooperative game.
The Cooperative Solution to Global Media
As in transfrontier pollution, the non-cooperative solution can be
improved. This is indicated by the lense formed by the indifference
curves I and ".
the countries.
1 2 curves I and I . Thus, there is room for improvement for at least one of
In a cooperative solution, side payments allow to reach a more efficient
solution. In a joint optimization problem, total costs for both countries
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Joint maximization requires that the aggregated prevented marginal damage
is equal to the marginal cost of abatement in country 1 which again must
be equal to the marginal cost of abatement in country 2. The equality in
the marginal cost of abatement implies efficiency in abatement. The
condition that the sum of marginal prevented damage is equal to the
marginal cost of abatement is Samuelson's summation condition for the
optimal provision of public goods. This implies the vertical addition of
the willingness to pay. For joint maximization the optimal supply is- 17 -
given by point C in figure 4 (where the (vertically) aggregated
willingness to pay, i.e. the aggregated marginal prevented damage (MD +
2 i o
MD ), and the (horizontally) aggregated cost function (MC + MC )
intersect.
Figure 4. Global
Environmental Media- 18 -
s?
Figure 5. Non-Cooperative and Cooperative
Solution for Global Environmental Media
or
In figure 5, the cooperative solution lies on a line C'C' where the
indifference curves of the two countries are tangent to each other. Point
1 2 C is a possible Pareto optimal solution. Any point in the lense I - I
represents an improvement relative to point A. The set of points in the
lense is given by the points on and under the curve CCC in figure 6.
The curve CCC* denotes possible improvement in the welfare of both
countries without side payments. If side payments along the 45° line DE
are arranged, total welfare of both countries may be increased. Figure 6
depicting the cooperative solution in the case of a global good can be
compared with the cooperative solution in the case of transfrontier






Figure 6. Welfare Improvements





A solution to global environmental issues consists in agreeing on a limit
for the total quantity of emissions and then allocating the tolerable
level of emissions to the individual countries. In contrast to the
transfrontier pollution problem, now the total quantity of emissions is
the decisive variable in the sense of a causal therapy.
Allocating the tolerable quantity of worldwide emissions by a uniform
reduction rate of x-percent in each country is not efficient. Some
countries may be able to reduce emissions at much lower costs. Moreover,
uniform reduction rates do not protect against reneging and thus endanger
the stability of the institutional arrangement.
Transferable discharge permits prevent the inefficiency of uniform
reduction schemes. They make sure that the reduction of emissions occurs
in the most efficient country. This means that the costs of environmental- 20 -
protection are minimized for a given target level of environmental
protection. Moreover, global environmental media are especially suited
for transferable discharge permits because diffusion problems ("hot
spots") are not relevant. In figure 4, point C denotes the global
environmental quality to be attained. A market for emissions rights will
establish the price corresponding to point C.
Allocating the initial endowment with discharge permits according to the
size of population may contribute to the stability of a worldwide system
of discharge permits (Grubb 1989). A country like China would then
receive a large share of global emission rights which it could sell to
the other countries. The other countries might also lease the emission
rights so that China may use them later. Allocating emission rights on a
per head basis may be a mechanism that contributes to the stability of
the institutional arrangement.
3. An International Order for the Environment
When international public goods are involved and when nations can behave
as a free rider or strategically, an institutional arrangement is called
for. Such an order defines the rules for the behavior of individual
countries. Each country has to commit itself to these rules. In
analytical structure, the problem is similar to the rules for
multilateral trade. This institutional arrangement is intended to prevent
strategic behavior of individual countries to improve its terms of trade.
The world as a whole can benefit from a cooperative solution, both in the
trade and in the environmental case. Some impetus is necessary to brake
the deadlock of a prisoner's dilemma, for instance a hegemon in the trade
case or, possibly, the pace setting of a country moving first in
environmental policy. Moreover, the stability of the institutional
arrangement poses a similar problem in the trade policy and in the
environmental case. Over time, the national interest of a country may
change; it may renege on the institutional arrangement which then becomes
instable . Like any international agreement, institutional arrangements
must therefore contain mechanisms that make them stable and prevent
reneging.- 21 -
Notes:
In a formal sense, one can always find a function H so that
G(E^, T(E
2)) - H(E^, E
1).
2




For the case of a global public good without an explicit diffusion
function compare Hoel 1990. For an explicit transfrontier model compare
Kuhl 1987.
4)











r r r r
5
) Compare Hoel (1990)
On the stability of investment contracts compare Thomas and Worrall
(1990), Mohr (1990).- 22 -
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